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[72] Summary 
Jacques Cujas and Hugues Doneau are reputed to be the standard-bearers of humanist 
jurisprudence, an approach to law which gained ground in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. A school averse to medieval legal science, Cujas and Doneau are likely to share its 
bashing attitude. Yet, in recent literature it is argued that both scholars adopted a more 
balanced view on medieval legal writings. This paper aims to shed light on what this view 
entailed, first, by investigating Cujas' and Doneau's own writings on methodology and, 
secondly, by examining how these jurists put their methodology to practice in their efforts to 
solve difficult points of law in Justinian's  Codex iuris civilis. The findings allow the author to 
speculate on Cujas' and Doneau's position vis-à-vis medieval legal heritage on the basis of a 
thorough analysis of their legal reasoning.  
 
[73] 'No one is a better jurist than Accursius'. Medieval Legal Scholarship as the 
Fountainhead of Inspiration for Jacques Cujas and Hugues Doneau?1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In contemporary legal literature Jacques Cujas (1520-1590) and Hugues Doneau (1527-1591) 
are reputed to be the standard–bearers of legal humanism, a movement in legal thought which 
emerged in 15th – century Italy and spread throughout other parts of Western-Europe2. Jurists 
with a humanist mindset were known by their aversion of what they called 'medieval' legal 
scholarship. In their eyes, medieval legal scholars had perverted and choked Justinian's 
Corpus Iuris Civilis (CIC) with their glosses and commentaries in rambling Latin law to such 
an extent that radical measures to purge this ancient compilation of jurisprudence from its 
medieval burden had become an absolute necessity3. Only then would a sound interpretation 
                                                          
1 This paper is an elaborated version of a presentation given at the Belgisch-Nederlandse Rechtshistorische 
Dagen on 13 December 2012. My special thanks go to those who made valuable remarks during the session, 
especially to Prof. mr. Jan Hallebeek for commenting upon previous drafts and the reviewers of the TvR who 
provided me with useful comments.  
2 F. Wieacker, Privatrechtgeschichte der Neuzeit, Göttingen, 1967, p. 167. 
3 G. Kisch, Bartolus und Basel, Basel 1960, p. 18: 'Der mos docendi gallicus wendete sich gegen die 
herkömmliche Jurisprudenz, ihre Verehrung der Autoritäten und scholastische Unterrichtsmethode. Seine 
Forderungen waren: Rückkehr zur reinen Rechtsquelle statt bloßer Anerkennung der Tradition, Erkenntnis der 
Rechtsidee statt des Autoritätenkults, System statt Exegese nach der Legalordnung'; P. Stein, 'Legal Humanism 
and Legal Science', Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 1986, vol. 54, p. 300; Wieacker, op. cit. (supra, n. 2), p. 
92; J.H.A. Lokin & W.J. Zwalve, Europese codificatiegeschiedenis, Den Haag, 2006, p. 176. 
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of the CIC be within reach of legal scholars4.      
 Yet, various studies have shown that this stereotype is not equally applicable to all the 
legal scholars who adhered to the humanist current 5 . Legal humanists often adopted a 
nuanced approach vis-à-vis their medieval predecessors. Besides, it is often neglected that 
legal humanism was not a monolithic school as different scholars applied their own accents. 
Cujas and Doneau, in particular, are known to have drawn on the inherited medieval ius 
commune in their own unique way6. However, their reasons for doing so have rarely been 
discussed. The same holds for Cujas' and Doneau' substantive treatment of the particular 
points of law in which their views come to the fore7. In this [74] contribution I attempt to 
discuss both. First, I will explore which methodological reasons moved the learned men to 
deal with the medieval legal inheritance in the way they did. Secondly, using two case 
studies, I will illustrate how Cujas and Doneau employed their methodological assumptions 
while treating questions of substantial law. Before embarking upon this legal journey, I will 
give a brief sketch of the humanist critique of medieval legal jurisprudence in general to 
provide the reader with an idea of the cultural climate in which Cujas and Doneau were 
active.    
 
  
                                                          
4 For all these points, see Claudius Cantiuncula's De ratione studii legalis paraenesis, Basel, 1522, thoroughly 
discussed by Kisch in G. Kisch, Claudius Cantiuncula. Ein Basler Jurist und Humanist des 16. Jahrhunderts, 
Basel, 1970.    
5 D. Maffei, Gli inizi dell’umanesimo giuridico, Milaan, 1956, p. 38; G.C.J.J. van den Bergh, Geleerd recht, (5th 
edition), Deventer, 2007, p. 63, 68, 172.  
6 For Cuiacius see J. Flach, ‘Cujas, les Glossateurs et les Bartolistes’, Nouvelle revue historique de droit 
français et étranger, 1883, p. 205-229; for Doneau: M.A. P. Eyssel, Doneau, sa vie et ses ouvrages, Dijon, 
1860. 
7 An exeption is posed by DeCock who discusses the humanist thought on the question to what extent buyer and 
seller are allowed to trick each other. W. DeCock, Theologians and Contract Law, Leuven, 2011 (diss.), p. 
460ff. 
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2. Humanists on Medieval Jurists 
As far back as the 14th – century Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374) wrote already8:  
'…pars magna legistarum nostri temporis de origine iuris et conditoribus legum nihil aut 
parum curat, didicisse contenta quid de contractibus deque iudiciis ac testamentis iure sit 
cautum, utque studii sui finem lucrum fecerit, cum tamen artium primordia et auctores nosse, 
et delectatione animi non vacet, et ad eius, de quo agitur, notitiam intellectui opem ferat (..)'.  
 
Petrarca criticised his contemporaries working in the legal profession – amongst whom 
Bartolus (1313-1357) and Baldus (1327-1400) numbered – for their lack of interest in 
historical matters. Indeed, critique of the a-historical character of medieval jurisprudence 
would become part of the standard repertoire of the humanistically inspired jurist.  
 The same can be said of the humanist censuring of the glossators' and commentators' 
idiomatic and allegedly opaque language. In particular Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457), a 
professor of rhetoric in Pavia, aimed his arrows at the dog Latin in use among medieval legal 
scholars. Compared to the beautiful chant of the classical jurists, this language merited no 
other qualification than the coarse gaggling of geese. [75]   
 
'(…) in locum Sulpitii, Scaevolae, Pauli, Ulpiani aliorumque (...) cygnorum (...) successerunt 
anseres Bartolus, Baldus, Accursius, Dinus caeterique, id genus hominum, qui non Romana 
lingua loquantur, sed barbara; non urbanam quandam morum civilitatem, sed agrestem 
rusticanamque immanitatem prae se ferant, denique non olores, sed anseres (...) existimantes 
vocem cantumque habere cygnorum'9. 
 
The same Valla boasted that he was able to do in three years what the renowned glossator 
Accursius had taken a large part of his lifetime to accomplish, i.e. the writing of the glossa 
ordinaria to the CIC10. Unsurprisingly, this condescending language infuriated many of the 
traditionally-orientated jurists up to the point that the Pavian professor, pursued by an 
unleashed horde of Bartolist scholars, was even forced to flee the town and seek refuge in 
Milan11.            
 Nevertheless, despite his quarrelsome character, Valla laid the foundations for a 
critique which reoccurred time and again, with later humanists contending that without 
proper knowledge of classical Latin and Greek every attempt to interpret the CIC was bound 
to fail.            
 The French humanist, practitioner and playwright François Rabelais (1494-1553) also 
                                                          
8 '...a major part of the jurists of our time only care little or do not care at all about the origins of the law and its 
founders, content as they are with knowing what is legally to be done with contracts and lawsuits, so that in the 
end their efforts are turned into profit. This despite the fact that it gives intellectual satisfaction to become 
acquainted with the foundations of the sciences and its authors, and that it provides one with the intellectual 
stock-in-trade needed to understand what a lawsuit is about', Francisco Petrarca, Epistolae de rebus familiaribus 
et variae, in: G. Fracassetti (red), Florence, 1863, p. 13; see F. Calasso, Medio evo del diritto, Milaan, 1954, p. 
597. All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated. 
9 'The geese Bartolus, Baldus, Accursius, Dinus and all others of the kind, a breed of men that does not speak the 
Roman language, but a barbarian, a breed of men that does not display any refinement of manners, but a coarse 
and burly barbarism, in one word, not swans, but gagglers, took the place of Sulpitius, Scaevaola, Paulus, 
Ulpian and of other (...) swans (...), imagining, o what blasphemy!, to possess the same voice and chant as 
queen-birds', Lorenzo Valla, Laurentii Vallae opera, Basel, 1540, p. 633; Cf. G. Kisch, Gestalten und Probleme 
aus Humanismus und Jurisprudenz, Berlijn, 1969, p. 37; Maffei, op. cit. (supra, n. 5), p. 38. 
10 Kisch, op cit. (supra, n. 9), p. 38, note 4.  
11 Maffei, op. cit. (supra, n. 5), p. 39.  
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did not doubt that medieval jurists regularly misinterpreted the CIC. In his book Pantagruel, 
staging a homonymous giant who had once studied law in Bologna, Rabelais has the narrator 
put the following words in the mouth of this peculiar character: 
'Et disoit aulcunesfois que les livres des loys luy sembloyent une belle robbe d’or (...) qui 
feust brodée de merde; (...). (...) la brodure d’iceulx, c’est assavoir la Glose de Accurse, est 
tant salle, tant d’infame et punaise, que ce n’est que ordure et villenie'12.   
[76] A bit further on in the same book, Rabelais parodies the medieval jurists' lust for citing 
authorities, when he makes Pantagrual attend judicial proceedings against one judge Bridoye 
who had been wont to decide cases by dice13. To the president's question put to Bridoye to 
reveal how he had ended up himself being tried in court, the judge retorted that it was just his 
old age which evidently brought deficiencies with it and that for that reason he should not be 
blamed for taking a four for a five,  
'(...) par disposition de droict, les imperfections de nature ne doibvent estre imputées à crime, 
comme appert, ff. de re milit. l. Qui cum uno, ff. de reg. iur. l. Fere, ff. de aedil. edi. per 
totum,  ff. de term. mod. l. Divus Adrianus resolut., per Lud. Ro. in l. Si vero, ff. sol. matr. Et 
qui austrement feroit, non l'homme accuseroit, mais nature, comme est evident, in l. 
Maximum vitium C. de lib. praeter.'14.  
The point that Rabelais wanted to bring home was that the medieval glosses and 
commentaries had turned the law into such a byzantine system that nearly every position 
could be defended, if one only managed to adduce the right authorities15.   
                                                          
12 'One time he said that, to him, the lawbooks resembled a beautiful golden robe (...) embroidered with dung 
(...). '(...) their embroidery, i.e. the Accursian Gloss, is so dirty, so impudent and shallow that it is nothing but 
shitty crookery'', François Rabelais, Oeuvres, vol. 1, Parijs, 1783, p. 220; Cf. Flach, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), p. 214; 
Lokin & Zwalve, op. cit. (supra, n. 3), p. 176. 
13 Rabelais, op. cit. (supra, n. 12), p. 544 : 'Comment Pantagruel assiste au jugement du juge Bridoye, lequel 
sentencioit les procès aus sort des dez'. 
14 Rabelais, op. cit. (supra, n. 12), p. 544: 'for it is a rule of law that natural flaws may not be reckoned a crime, 
as is stated clearly in ff. de re milit. l. Qui cum uno [D. 49.16.4pr.], ff. de reg. iur. l. Fere [D. 50.17.108/109 
(vulg.)], ff. de aedil. edi. per totum [D. 21.1, ff. de term. mod. l. Divus Adrianus resolut. [D. 47.21.2], per Lud. 
Ro. in l. Si vero, ff. sol. matr. [Ludovicus Bologninus' commentary on D. 24.3.64]. He who does otherwise, does 
not impute the man, but nature, as evidently follows from l. Maximum vitium, C. de lib. praeter [C. 6.28.4]'. 
Rabelais' allegations are not unequivocal illustrations of what he contends. Quite some imaginative thinking is 
required to distil the rule which Bridoye states from D. 49.16.4pr.: 'Qui cum uno testiculo natus est, (...), iure 
militabit, (...). Nam et duces Sulla et Cotta memorantur eo habitu fuisse naturae ('He who is born with only one 
testicle (...) shall rightly serve in the army. After all, it is remembered that the commanders Sulla and Cotta were 
of that condition by nature)'. Admittedly, medieval commentators likewise were not averse to what we would 
now consider rather overly loose interpretations of CIC texts.    
15 Another passage in Pantagruel demonstrates that Rabelais uses the entire repertory of humanist objections. 
Asked to assist in a case, upon receiving a huge pile of documents Pantagruel launches into the following tirade: 
'De quoy diable doncques (dict-il) servent tant de fatrasseries de papiers et copies que me baillez? N'est-ce le 
mieux ouyr par leur visve voix leur desbat, que lire ces babouyneries icy, qui ne sont que tromperies, cautelles 
diaboliques de Sapila, et subversions de droit? Car je suis seur que vous et tous ceulx par les mains desquels a 
passé le procès, y avez machiné ce qu'avez peu, pro et contra: et au cas que leur controverse estoit patente, et 
facile á juger, vous l'avez obscurcie par sottes et desraisonnables raisons et ineptes opinions d'Accurse, Balde, 
Bartole, de Castro, de Imola, Hippolytus, Panorme, Bertachin, Alexander, Curtius et ces austres vieulx mastins, 
qui jamais n'entendirent la moindre loy des pandectes, et n'estoyent que gros veaulx de disme, ignorants de tout 
ce que'est necessaire à l'intelligence des loix. (...). Dadvantaige veu que les loix sont extirpées du milieu de 
philosophie morale et naturelle, comment l'entendront ces fols qui ont par Dieu moins estudié en philosophie 
que ma mule? Au reguard des lettres d'humanité et cognoissance des anticquitez et histoires, ils en estoyent 
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 [77] A final reproach of medieval jurisprudence is formulated by Doneau and 
concerns the superfluous character of many medieval commentaries: 
'Nusquam enim fere plures scripserunt, nusquam maiores commentarii et prolixiores: 
apparetque maximam partem sedulo atque optimo studio scripsisse. (...) Ac si non iniqui 
istorum laborum aestimatores esse volumus, fatendum est, dignos esse omnes magna laude 
vel hoc nomine, quod publice, quae noverant, in commune contulerunt, et pro virili salutarem 
artem iuvare studuerunt. (...) Sed quod de omnibus in universum vere dicere liceat, saepe 
sedulitati et bonis conatibus successus non respondit, contraque evenit potius, ut multitudo 
scribentium augeret difficultates, non minueret'16.     
 
 To conclude: in the eyes of the humanists medieval legal scholarschip was a-
historical, used some kind of degenerated Latin, lost itself in myriads of references and did 
not succeed in producing elucidating works. Yet, humanists sportingly offered mitigating 
circumstances to explain this saying. Medieval jurists could not have helped but make 
mistakes, since the low level of legal scholarship was a logical consequence of the depraved 
conditions in which [78] medieval society as a whole was set17. Hence, the medieval jurist 
was not to blame because he simply could not have done better. It was up to the humanists to 
remedy these deficiencies.    
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
chargez comme un crapaut de plumes, dont toutesfoit les droicts sont tous pleins, et sans ce ne peuvent estre 
entendus; (...),' Rabelais, op. cit. (supra, n. 12), p. 248-49. 
16  'In hardly any other discipline have so many written such bulky and verbose commentaries, though it appears 
that the majority wrote with the utmost dilligence and willpower. (...) Now if we do not want to be insincere 
judges of their efforts, we must admit that they are all worthy of high praise for openly divulging to the 
community what they knew and for having strived for a healthy science as best as they could. (...) Nevertheless 
– and this can be said to apply to all in full – often their diligence and laudable attempts have not yielded succes. 
Rather the contrary occured, so that the multitude of authors increased the difficulties, instead of reducing them', 
Hugo Donellus, Hugonis Donelli commentarii de jure civili, vol. 1, Neurenberg 1801, xl–xli. 
17 This pardon repeatedly occurs in humanist discourse. Cf. Donellus, op. cit. (supra, n. 16), xxxviii: 'Quod non 
magis iniquitati et imperitae temporum, quam rerum difficultati tribuendum est'; Angeli Politiani Operum: 
tomus primus, vol. 1, Lyon 1539, p. 295, 10.4 (1453): 'Deprehendi igitur multa novis in codicibus vitia, multa in 
interpretibus: quoniam videlicet inerudito nati seculo (...)', (I found many mistakes in  recent [i.e. vulgate] 
lawbooks and works of commentators, of course because they lived in an uncouth age (…)’). Geciteerd in 
Kisch, op. cit. (supra, n. 9), p. 39; Bonifacius Amerbach, Defensio interpretum iuris civilis, 270. 'Equidem quod 
ad Accursium pertinet, parum latine scripsit crebroque in vocabulis paulo obscurioribus explicandis lapsus est, 
id quod mirum videri non debet seculo tam inerudito, (..)'. Uitgegeven door G. Kisch, Humanismus und 
Jurisprudenz, Basel, 1955, p. 79-97; Maffei, op. cit.( supra, n. 5), p. 57.    
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3. Cujas and Doneau 
 
One might be inclined to think that it goes without saying that Cujas and Doneau, the putative 
standard-bearers of legal humanism, fully endorsed the humanist abhorrence of medieval 
jurisprudence as presented above. However, closer examination of their works shows that 
their attitude towards medieval legal scholarship was based on a more balanced judgement. 
3.1. Cujas 
Cujas was rather vocal about his admiration for Accursius (1185-c. 1263), the famous 
compiler of the glosses to the CIC which had been written up until his time. In a letter to 
Brassicanus18, a jurist friend, he wrote: 
'Quare saepe, multumque cogitanti mihi videtur nemo melior esse Accursio IC. optime de iure 
civili merito. Multa enim, in eo sunt utilia, licet quaedam sint minus πρόσφορα και μὴ 
ἔναρμοσα, sed illa adscribemus temporum iniquitati. Casus in glossa minime sunt legendi, 
non sunt Accursii. Illud etiam pro certo habeas, semper unam ex opinionibus ab Accursio 
alatis esse veram'19.     
[79] These remarks by Cujas are difficult to square with the picture of the humanistically 
inspired jurist as presented by Valla, Rabelais and other humanists. Cujas admiring a 
glossator and the most renowned man whom Bologna, centre of the so despised medieval 
legal scholarship, had ever produced at that!       
 In the following passages taken from Cujas' inaugural lecture De ratione docendi iuris 
it appears that he praised the glossators, because their methodology was strongly related to 
that of the jurists of Justinian's age. Cujas unfolds a few things in his treatment of the word 
gloss. 
'Glossae inquam, ut vulgus loquitur, ut proprie loquar, Scholia, sunt, (…), interpretationes 
linguae secretioris, sive vocum minus usitatarum, quae verbum pro verbo reddunt:(…). 
Scholia hoc amplius et similes et in usum vel speciem dissimiles locos notant et distinctiones 
varias atque sententias priorum interpretum Irnerii, Jacobi, Ugolini, Bulgarii, Rogerii, 
Cypriani, Martini, Placentini, quorum magna pars fuit in concilio Friderici I, imperatoris 
[Barbarossa 1122-1190]). (...) atque ita complures me Scholia legisse profecto non poenitet: 
his dum potior  facile transvolo illis aliquos adglutinare Doctores longe lateque recedentes a 
Juliano, Papiniano et Scholiorum quoque illorum auctoribus, qui verbis ad intellectum rei, qua 
                                                          
18 Ambrosius Brassicanus († after 1550), Flach, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), p. 207. 
19 'Therefore, frequently and deeply pondering over your question, it appears to me that no one is a better jurist 
than Accursius, who has made himself very creditable in civil law. Many things he has written are useful, 
though some of them are less to the point and not in harmony, but we shall blame the unfavourable age for that. 
The cases in the Gloss you should read only cursorily, since they are not his. Keep one thing for certain; there is 
always a right interpretation among those proposed by Accursius', Christophorus Colerus & Jacobus Cuiacius, 
De ratione discendi ius civile oratio cum appensa Iacobi Cuiacii IC. principis epistola, Straatsburg 1600, p. 25; 
for a discussion of the letter's authenticity see Flach, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), p. 205ff.; Eysell, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), 
p. 176.   
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de agitur, ultra quam satis est, utuntur. Absit igitur ut haec Scholia (quod faciunt quidem male 
sani et inexperientes rei quam tangunt) comparem panno insuto purpurae'20.   
 [80] It helps to understand Cujas' sympathy for the glossators when considering the 
goals he himself hoped to achieve with his legal writings. A humanist in the Erasmian sense 
of the word, Cujas' efforts were aimed at finding the right interpretation of the legal texts in 
Justinian's CIC. Just as Erasmus endeavoured to correct Jerome's Vulgate bible with the use 
of all the manuscripts he could find in the hope of enabling a better reading of the New 
Testament21, Cujas strived to make an emendation of Accursius' Glossa Ordinaria to the CIC 
by using all the texts from jurists before and after Accursius' time that he could lay his hands 
on22. To make a corrected version of the New Testament, Erasmus fell back on the early-
church Fathers Origenes, Athanasius, Basilius, Gregorius of Nyssa, Chrysostomus, Cyrillus, 
Theophylactus, as well as on the medieval scholars Beda the Venerable and Thomas Aquinas, 
comparing their commentaries and glosses with the Vulgate23. Cujas hoped that a better 
understanding of the CIC could be achieved by drawing from Byzantian legal commentaries 
and comparing these with the works of the glossators and commentators. Just as Erasmus had 
contended that he was doing no more than holy Jerome had done before him24, Cujas saw 
himself as a member of the school of Irnerius [81] and Accursius, scholars who had worked 
to the best of their knowledge for no other purpose than to furnish law students with the finest 
                                                          
20 'I say 'glosses', in accordance with common understanding, but more properly speaking they are 'scholia', (...), 
interpretations of opaque language or words not so often used, which they explain word by word: (...). On top of 
this, scholia also note corresponding places or places that differ in use or appearance, and the various 
distinctions and opinions given by the earlier glossators Irnerius, Jacobus, Bulgarus, Rogerius, Cyprianus, 
Martinus and Placentinus, the majority of whom lived in the circle of Emperor Frederic I. (...) and so I do not at 
all regret having read many scholia, since with these I more easily pass over those things glued to the texts by 
some learned men who, departing from Julian, Papinian and the writers of those scholia, use more words than 
necessary in order to understand what something is about. Hence, let it be far from me to compare these scholia 
with a dirty cloth stuck on a purple mantle, as some mentally ill men, ignorant of the matter they touch upon, 
do', Jacobus Cuiacius, 'De ratione docendi iuris oratio', in: Cuiacius, J. Opera omnia, vol. 8,  Napels, 1722, p. 
1122 E. Lecture given in 1585 A.D.  
21 'Nos enim non sic proponimus hanc aeditionem, ut velimus per omnia haberi emendatam, sed quod apud 
Graecos frequentissimum habetur maximeque constans, id vertimus, (...)', (After all, we do not propose this 
edition as wanting it to be held for an in every sense corrected version. However, we translated that which is 
most frequently held by the Greek and most tenable (...))', D. Erasmus, 'Capita argumentorum contra morosos 
quosdam ac indoctos', in: Opera omnia, vol. 6, Basel, 1541, fo b3v; Lokin & Zwalve, op. cit. (supra, n. 3), p. 
177.  
22 R. Lesaffer, Inleiding tot de Europese rechtsgeschiedenis, Leuven, 2004, p. 322, nr. 309.  
23 Cf. Erasmus' apologie to his New Testament edition: 'Illud potius spectandum quid legerint veteres Graeci, 
Origenes, Athanasius, Basilius, Gregorius Nazianzus, Chrysostomos, Cyrillus ac Theophylactus, (It is better to 
look at what was read by the ancient Greeks Origenes, Athanasius, Basilius, Gregorius of Nyssa, Chrysostomus, 
Cyrillus and Theophylactus)', Erasmus, op. cit. (supra, n. 21), fo b3. References to Beda Venerabilis and 
Thomas Aquinas can be found in the same essay. 
24 'Quum Damasus hoc negocii daret Hieronymo, ut novum testamentum ex Graecorum fontibus emendaret, 
habebat nimirum iam tum ecclesia quod legebat et fortassis seculis aliquot legerat. Id si syncerum erat, quid 
opus erat emendatione Hieronymi? Sin corruptum, palam est ecclesiam ad tempus uti, quod sit in melius 
vertendum, (When Damasus gave Jerome the task of correcting the New Testament from Greek sources, the 
Church, unsurprisingly, was already in possession of a New Testament which it read and which, perhaps, it had 
already been reading for ages. If that was flawless, what need would there have been for Jerome's correction? 
However, if it was corrupt, the Church at the time was obviously using something in need of a better 
translation)', Erasmus, op. cit. (supra, n. 21), fo b3. 
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tools to interprete Justinian's lawbook25.       
 After all, in Cujas' eyes glosses or scholia also presented a helpful means of ensuring 
quick access and insight into Justinian's compilation. They show the scholar grappling with a 
difficult text the way to other relevant texts in the CIC, they note concurring opinions of other 
glossators, and they help to clarify obscure passages. All this ably supported the final aim 
Cujas always bore in mind: finding the right interpretation of the CIC's texts. Hence his 
disqualification of Rabelais flinging mud at the Gloss saying his actions provided less proof 
of Rabelais being a witty man than it did of revealing him to be utterly misinformed about 
legal matters26.          
 In the preamble to his Paratitla in libros ix codicis Cujas explores the link between 
the glossators' working method and that of the Byzantine writers of interpretations 'that 
follow on the heels' (κατὰ πόδας interpretationes). Again, Cujas emphasises how glossators 
did law in the manner Justinian himself had envisaged it to be done. Furthermore, Cujas 
explains when legal scholarship lost track of the right course: 
'(...) nobis fuisse necesse iuri antiquo et longa desuetudine corrupto obscuratoque ex 
commentariis lumen foenerare, non sufficiente, eo quod ab illo tempore attulerant [82] 
Summarum vel Glossarum auctores primi. (...). Hi caverant maxime ne ab Iustiniani edicto 
migrare viderentur, editis primum Summis, quas habuere pro paratitlis, deinde etiam glossis, 
pro ea quam idem Iustinianus κατὰ πόδας interpretationem appellat. Nam si praeter paratitla 
etiam Graeca lingua κατὰ πόδας fieri interpretationem Iustinianus permitteret, cur non sibi 
liceret etiam audere Latina, quod ille permitteret Graeca, existimarunt non esse causam, 
breviter scilicet et apte nec pluribus multo verbis, quam leges ipsae scriptae forent eae enim 
sunt proprie glossae, eae κατὰ πόδας interpretationes. Sed haec cum non explerent obtusiora 
ingenia, nec satis ius illustrare videntur, supervenere alii qui non mutato nomine glossas 
auctiores redderent, quam pateretur ipsum glossarum nomen, atque ita paulatim glossae factae 
gravidae quaesierunt sibi liberos ingentes, immanes, insanos commentarios'27.        
                                                          
25 'Eisdem temporibus dominus Vuernerius libros legum, qui dudum neglecti fuerant, nec quisquam in eis 
studuerat, ad petitionem Mathildae Comitissae renovavit. Et secundum quod olim a divae recordationis 
imperatore Justiniano compilati fuerant, paucis forte alicubi interpositis, eos distinxit, in quibus continentur 
instituta praefati Imperatoris, quasi principium et introductio iuris civilis, edicta quoque praetorum et aedilium 
curulium, quae rationem et firmitatem praestant iuri civili, haec in libro Pandectarum, videlicet, in Digestis 
continentur. Additur quoque his liber Codicis, in quo Imperatorem statuta describuntur. Quartus quoque est 
liber Autenticorum, quem praefatus Justinianus ad suppletionem et correctionem legum imperialium 
superaddidit' [my emphasis], Eccardus de Uraugia († c. 1125), Chronicon, Straatsburg, 1540, p. 212; Calasso, 
op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 526, n. 13. 
26 The last sentence quoted indeed seems to be a taunt at Rabelais' expense, as noted by Flach. Cf. the passages 
taken from Rabelais' Pantagruel. However, in common with Troje I do not endorse Flach's observation that 
Cuiacius tried to restore pre-Justinian classical Roman law, faire revivre le véritable droit de la Rome ancienne. 
Cuiacius made equal use of the Gloss and Byzantine writings as of classical sources to come to the best 
interpretation of the texts in the CIC. At times he followed the Roman jurists, at other times Tribonian. Flach, 
op. cit. (supra, n. 6), p. 214, 221–222; H.E. Troje, Humanistische  Jurisprudenz, Goldbach, 1993, p. 186ff. 
27 '(..) For me it was necessary for the ancient law which had been corrupted and obfuscated because of long 
neglect to bring back light into the commentaries, while that which the earliest writers of glosses or summaries 
since then [the CIC's rediscovery] had produced did not suffice (...). True, they painstakingly saw to it not to 
move away from Justinian's edict,27 first editing Summae, which they held for explanatory notes (paratitla), and 
then writing glosses, which they conceived of as that which Justinian called interpretations 'that follow on the 
heels'27. After all, if, next to explanatory notes Justinian had allowed for the, what in Greek is called κατὰ πόδας-
interpretations, why then would not they be at liberty to dare the same in Latin? They did not believe there was a 
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It is noteworthy that Cujas severely condemns the scholars who added all sorts of things to 
the glosses and that he reproaches other scholars, who 'under [83] the same header, expanded 
the glosses to such an extent that they no longer endured the name 'gloss'', and had caused the 
rampant growth of commentaries. It is a well-known fact that Cujas abhorred the 
commentators almost as much as he appreciated the glossators; his extensive library did not 
even contain a single copy of a book written by the former28. After all, commentators did 
exactly the opposite of what a legal scholar, in Cujas' opinion, was supposed to do; not 
sticking to short remarks but rendering long-drawn-out expositions, they went beyond plainly 
indicating to the inquisitive jurist which road to follow to arrive at the right reading of the law 
text. Moreover, Cujas took offense to that other trade which commentators excelled in, i.e. 
creating rules. 'For the law existed prior to rules (...). Arguments deduced from rules of law 
are without substance and dangerous. In a word, one should not argue on their basis'29. 
 It may be clear by now where Cujas' preferences lay. Short and to-the-point notes 
were the better instruments for the legal exegesis of Justinian's compilation. Glosses – in 
Cujas' true sense of the word that is – sufficed to get to the core of the texts in the CIC and 
nothing more than some explanatory marginal notes were needed to enable a jurist to work 
with the Justinianic sources.        
 Admittedly, the content of Cujas' scholia differed from that of the glosses written by 
his medieval predecessors. After all, the latter scholars had fewer and poorer quality tools at 
their disposal30. Compared to 16th- century standards, their knowledge of history and classical 
languages was limited, whereas Cujas could make use of all the fresh fruits of renaissance 
learning. Eagerly doing so, he did not shrink from steering away from accepted doctrine 
when the newly interpreted sources induced him to do so. However, that should be 
considered a result which was less of a reaction against medieval scholarship than of a more 
thorough continuation of how law had been done in the past ages, something which I hope 
will become clear from the cases discussed later in this paper31.       
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
particular reason for allowing it only in Greek, since their own glosses too, written in a concise and to-the-point 
manner and without many more words than the number with which the lawtexts themselves were written, were 
κατὰ πόδας- interpretations. However, when these glosses could not satisfy the more obtuse minds and when 
these did not seem to explain the law satisfactorily, other scholars followed who, under the same header, 
expanded the glosses to such an extent that they no longer endured the name 'gloss'. And so it gradually ensued 
that the glosses became pregnant and sought to produce monstrous children for themselves, obese, unhealthy 
commentaries'', Jacobus Cuiacius, Paratitla in libros ix. Codicis Iustiniani, Keulen, 1577, p. 1–3.  
28 Flach, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), p. 216, note 3. 
29 'Ius enim prius regula. (...) levia sunt argumenta, quae deducuntur ex regula iuris et periculosa. Denique ex 
his non est argumentandum', Cuiacius, op. cit.  (supra, n. 20), p. 706.  
30 G.C.J.J. Van den Bergh, Die holländische elegante Schule, Frankfurt a/M, 2002, p. 37. 
31  Calasso, op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 524–525, no. 12; R. Stintzing, Geschichte der deutschen 
Rechtswissenschaften, vol. I/3, book 4, 1880, p. 376: 'Cujas steht im entschiedensten Gegensatze zu den 
"Bartolisten", mit denen er in Toulouse in Conflict geräth, in so fern er eine exacte, alle Hülfsmittel der Kritik 
und der Alterthumswissenschaft verwendende Behandlung der Quellen fordert'.    
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[84] 3.2. Doneau 
To Hugues Doneau, things were somewhat different. Although the one-time Leiden 
professor32 also sympathied with his medieval predecessors, it was not the glossators, but the 
commentators whom he trumpetted, though this too was in a balanced way33. In the preamble 
to his Commentarius de iure civile, Doneau's magnum opus in which he systematically goes 
through Justinian's CIC, Doneau describes the difficulties that someone grappling with 
Justinianic law has to deal with. The major reason that the CIC is so hard to comprehend is its 
fragmentary tradition. Since Justinian, only a very few individuals can claim to have 
overcome the CIC's complex and confusing transmission and to possess a profound and 
certain knowledge of the law34. Doneau wrote this rather uninviting introduction to the study 
of law: 
'(...) ut intelligatur, parum esse ad studium suscipiendum praestantiae ullius, et amplitudinis, 
(...), commendationem, si aliunde adiumenta desunt ad ius pernoscendum (...) sine quibus 
haud unquam facile futurum sit, ut hic quisquam eum finem quem petit, attingat, iuris 
cognitionem. Aut enim difficultate debilitatus cum spe consequendi etiam cognoscendi 
studium abiiciet: aut si perseverandum putabit, hinc quidem obscuritate et perplexitate rerum 
circumventus facile pro veris falsa, pro utilibus inutilia, pro solidis inania complectetur, ut in 
tenebris errare et decipi facillimum est; illinc autem varietate negotiorum et multitudine 
impedito atque distracto eveniet, ut prius illum vita defecerit, quam vel unam partem ex 
innumeris totam plane sit assecutus. (...) Quod cum sentirent maiores nostri, illi maxime, qui 
post tempora Justiniani haec studia ante omissa velut postliminio revocarunt, sapienter 
providerunt, ne his studiis illa adiumenta dessent. (...) Haec eadem cogitatio atque hic sensus 
patrum nostrorum memoria impulit tam multos, ut in ius civile scriberent, in quibus non pauci 
fuerunt excellenti ingenio, et, ut tum [85] tempora concedebant, etiam doctrina, quibus 
studium fuit occurrrere tenebris iuris, et cursum horum studiorum ante non tam impeditum, 
quam interclusum, planiorem et faciliorem reddere'35.   
                                                          
32 From 1579 to 1587 A.D. See R. Stintzing, Hugo Donellus in Altdorf, Erlangen, 1869, p. 18ff. 
33 Flach, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), p. 225. Curiously, Flach does not conclude this on the basis of Doneau's own 
writings.     
34 'Vix enim dici potest, ex tam inmmenso numero eorum, qui se post Iustiniani tempora ad ius civile certatim 
contulerunt, quam pauci omnibus aetatibus exstiterint, quibus huius iuris veram et solidam cognitionem 
concedas. (...). Quorsum haec de operis huius et disciplinae difficultate, ubi homines potius ad eius studium 
excitari conveniebat?', Donellus, op. cit. (supra, n. 16), xxxviii.  
35'(...) in order that one understands that reverence for some pre-eminence and grandeur, (...), is not enough to 
take up the study of the law, if for the rest the means for understanding the law are lacking, without which 
means it will not easily happen that someone here achieves the final goal, i.e. knowledge of the law. Debilitated 
by the difficulties he will, together with the hope of acquiring knowledge, break off his efforts to learn, or, if he 
thinks he must persevere, it will happen that, deceived by the obscurity and perplexity of things, he will easily 
embrace false as true, useless as useful and trifles as things of the utmost importance, since in the dark one is 
lightly deceived and led astray. Hence, hindered and distracted by the variety and multitude of cases, he will 
sooner see the end of his days than that he will really succeed in completely mastering only a single fragment 
out of the innumerable existing. (...). While our forefathers and then in particular those who lived subsequent to 
Justinian's age realised this and called this until that moment neglected discipline back from banishment, so to 
speak, they wisely saw to it that this discipline would not lack instruments. (...). The same thought and idea as 
our forefathers' urged many to write on the civil law, among whom not a few possessed an excellent wit, and, in 
as much as their age allowed, a fine education, in the hope to fend off obscurity and to make the honorary 
curriculum of this discipline, though not so much shorter, plainer and easier, at least less impenetrable', 
Donellus, op. cit. (supra, n. 16), xxxvii-xl. 
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Doneau valued the medieval scholars' struggles to diminish the spinosities in interpreting the 
CIC, even though he found their efforts not particularly succesful: 'Rather the contrary 
occured, so that the multitude of authors increased the difficulties, instead of reducing 
them'36. Yet, in keeping with his predecessors' ambitions, Doneau saw that the task set before 
him was to produce aids that did work. However, his methodological approach differed in 
considerable measure from that of his medieval precursors. Notwithstanding that Bartolus 
and his contemporaries had written commentaries in accordance with the sequence of the 
CIC' texts and had commented on and interpreted each title separately, Doneau dismissed 
Justinian's order as too incoherent and as one that did not do justice to the logical ideas and 
concepts lying behind the CIC's separate texts37.         
 [86] Yet, Doneau did not want to discard the content of the medieval commentaries in 
the same breath. On the contrary, in our treatment of questions of substantial law, we shall 
see that Doneau did not recoil from drawing on medieval doctrinal heritage if it contained 
information which supported his interpretation of Justinianic law38.   
  
                                                          
36 '(...) contraque evenit potius, ut multitudo scribentium augeret difficultates, non minueret', Donellus, op. cit. 
(supra, n. 16), p. 41. 
37 'Sed et quae in singulis partibus et legibus adhibetur interpretatio, quo ordine ista tradita sunt, etiam si 
adhibeatur in omnibus, consistit tamen in disiunctis membris, minimeque cohaerentibus: quae quo plura sunt 
proposita ad explicandum, eo magis corpus ipsum divellunt ac distrahunt. (...). At qui nos totum quaerimus, non 
certas aliquas partes quamquam [quoniam?] nec partes, quatenus tales sunt, sine toto facile cognosci possunt' 
(Yet, also the interpretation of separate fragments and laws derives from the order in which they are handed 
over. Nevertheless, even if an interpretation emerges out of it all, it is still grounded in loosely jointed fragments 
which show not the slightest coherence. Hence it happens that the more explanations are proposed, the more 
they tear apart and pull asunder the body of law (...). But we, who are in search of the complete picture, cannot 
easily understand some certain fragment, since the proper meaning of fragments cannot be known without an 
understanding of the whole)', Donellus, op. cit. (supra, n. 16), xliv; C.A. Cannata, ‘Systématique et Dogmatique 
dans les Commentariis Iuris Civilis de Hugo Donellus’ in B. Schmidlin en A. Dufour (red.),  Jacques Godefroy 
et l’Humanisme juridique à Genève. Actes du colloque Jacques Godefroy, Basel 1991, p. 220. 
38 E.g. Doneau frequently refers to the works of Bartolus, both to underpin his own argument and to construe his 
own divergent opinion. Cf. '(...) quod Bartolus recte scripsit', Donellus, op. cit. (supra, n. 16), p. 29; 'Hoc enim 
bene Bartolus expedit', Hugo Donellus, Hugonis Donelli commentarii de jure civili, vol. 3, p. 272; 'etsi Bartolus 
contra disputat et sensit', Idem, p. 373.  
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4. Cases 
 
Now that we know a bit more about Cujas' and Doneau's methodological views, I would like 
to investigate how they were put to effect in their treatment of two debated points of law. For 
this purpose I largely draw on the findings of my Ph.D. – research on the seller's liability for 
latent defects in the early-modern period39.       
 The Justinianic law regarding latent defects deals with cases in which someone 
bought a thing, e.g. a horse, which, after the sale, turns out to be defective, e.g. the horse 
suffers from a disease which could not have been discovered by either seller or buyer at the 
time the sale was concluded. Ancient Roman law (753 – ca. 200 B.C.) did not provide 
remedies under these circumstances, unless the seller had warranted the thing's quality or 
committed fraud40. However, this rather strict law backfired on the banks of the River Tiber, 
where cattle and slaves were sold in large numbers by rather unreliable salesmen who were 
clever enough to conceal their fraud. The seller frequently argued that he was as unaware of 
the defect as the buyer was and could not have known about it. According to ancient Roman 
law, he then did not have to answer for the defect, since he had not behaved in a faulty 
manner. As a result, the buyer had to bear all incurred losses. Pre-classical Roman law (200 – 
27 B.C.) tried to remedy the [87] buyer's predicament while attempting to steer a middle 
coarse between the position of the unknowing seller on the one hand and the duped buyer on 
the other. Rules pertaining to latent defects were spelled out in an edict promulgated by the 
aediles curules, turned into law no later than the first century B.C., according to which the 
buyer of a defective thing could claim a reduction of price (actio quanti minoris) or rescission 
of the contract (actio redhibitoria)41. Through a rather hard to follow development of Roman 
civil law, remedying latent defects also became possible by instituting the civil action on the 
sales contract from the second century A.D. onwards 42 . The edictal remedies and the 
remedies available under the action on the sales contract both found a place in Justinian's 
CIC. The first were brought under titles D. 21.1. and C. 4.58, the latter under titles D. 19.1.1 
and C. 4.49.  
 
4.1. First Case: Can the Aedilitian Remedies Be Used in Other Contracts than Sales? 
In the Middle Ages, the question arose as to whether the rules pertaining to latent defects 
applied to contracts other than sales. E.g. could a lessee rescind the lease contract, if it turned 
                                                          
39 This thesis is set to be finished in Spring 2016. 
40 R. Zimmermann, The law of obligations. Roman foundations of the civilian tradition, Oxford, 1996, p. 308-
310. 
41 A. de Senarclens, 'La date de l'édit des édiles de mancipiis vendundis', Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 4, 
1923, p. 384, 392. 
42 Zimmermann, op. cit. (supra, n. 42), p. 320-321. 
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out that the leased house suffered from a latent defect?43 At first glance, the CIC seems rather 
straightforward. D. 21.1.63 reads: 
Ulpianus libro primo ad edictum aedilium curulium : Sciendum est ad venditiones solas hoc 
edictum pertinere non tantum mancipiorum, verum ceterarum quoque rerum. Cur autem de 
locationibus nihil edicatur, mirum videbatur: haec tamen ratio redditur vel quia numquam 
istorum de hac re fuerat iurisdictio vel quia non similiter locationes ut venditiones44 fiunt45.               
[88] By way of conclusion, the Gloss fiunt ('is carried out') to this text remarks that 'after all, 
in lease one does not intend to transfer property, as one does in sales, see above D. 19.2.39'46. 
Thus, the Gloss appears to argue that the conveyance of ownership is crucial to applying the 
aedilitian edict to a contract other than sales. With D. 21.1.63 posing that the different 
character of sale and lease contracts impedes an extensive application of the edict's provisions 
and D. 19.2.39 providing that lease does not convey ownership, the Gloss assumes that it has 
grasped the meaning of the phrase 'because lease is not carried out in the same manner as 
sales'.             
 Reasoning thus, the Gloss departed from the literal text in Justinian's compilation, as 
no argument similar to 'the aedilitian remedies do not apply to lease, because in lease there is 
no intention of conveying ownership' is to be found in the entire Justinianic corpus. Drawing 
such a conclusion is only possible with the acceptance of an implicit premise, i.e. that the 
difference between sales and lease which D. 21.1.63 hints at is the transferral of ownership, 
as mentioned in D. 19.2.39 47 . In accepting the implicit assumption that conveyance of 
ownership is needed for the application of the aedilitian edict, the Gloss applied itself to the 
rule-making so despised by Cujas48. 
  
                                                          
43 See e.g. H. Dilcher, Die Theorie der Leistungsstörungen bei Glossatoren, Kommentatoren und Kanonisten, 
Frankfurt a/M., 1960, p. 333ff. 
44 Translating fiunt is tricky. Spruit translates fiunt as 'aangegaan worden', which is problematic, since sales and 
lease are concluded in exactly the same manner, i.e. by consensus. Watson renders the words non similiter fiunt 
as 'circumstances are different', which is no less vague than the Latin text. I opted for an equally opaque 'carried 
out'. After all, as will appear, the glossators did not have a clear idea about the meaning of the passage. In doing 
so, I hope to limit bias in the rendering of the Latin as much as possible. J. Spruit e.a (red.), Corpus iuris civilis. 
Tekst en vertaling, vol. 8, Amsterdam, 2007; A. Watson (ed.), The Digest of Justinian, vol. 2, Philadelphia, 
1985. My thanks go to Prof. mr. T. Wallinga and Dr. J. Jansen with whom I discussed this text. 
45 D. 21.1.63: Ulpian. First book on the curulian aediles' edict: 'You should know that the edict pertains to sales 
only. Not just sales of slaves, but of other goods as well. Why nothing has been promulgated for lease, seemed 
something to wonder about. However, this reasoning is given: either because there has never been legal 
competence for them [the aediles, NdB] for that subject, or because lease is not carried out in the same manner 
as sales'. 
46 'non enim in locatione intendit transferri dominium ut in emptione, ut s[supra] loca. Non solet [D.19.2.39]',H. 
de la Porte (ed.), Corpus iuris civilis, Lyon, 1558; D. 19.2.39: Ulpianus libro secundo ad edictum: Non solet 
locatio dominium mutare, (lease is not wont to change ownership).  
47 For another example of the Glossator's inclination to surmise implicit arguments in the CIC when their 
existence is dubious see J. Gordley, Ius Quaerens Intellectum: The Method of Medieval Civilians, in: J.W. 
Cairns & P.J. Du Plessis (ed.), The Creation of the Ius Commune: from Casus to Regula, Edinburgh, 2012, p. 
96. 
48 For a more thorough analysis of the glossator's rule-making, see Calasso,  op. cit. (supra, n. 8), p. 531–534. 
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4.1.1. Cujas on the Extension of the Aedilitian Remedies to Lease 
Hence it may be no surprise that Cujas did not heed the Gloss' denial of the application of the 
aedilitian remedies to lease. In his Observationum libri xii he gives the following alternative 
interpretation of D. 21.1.63: 
'(...) ratio est duplex: ἔνστασις et ἀντιπαράστασις, et ob id liquida neutra satis, ut plerumque 
eius quod mirum iuris auctoribus videtur, nulla con- [89] stat ratio certa, l. liberum, ff. De 
relig. Et prudenter Ulpianus refert tantum illas rationes reddi, quas ipse tamen se probare non 
indicat'49. 
As a consequence, the fact that the aediles did not promulgate about lease, Cujas comments, 
does not say anything about the aedilitian remedies' applicability to that contract: 
'At ex diverso ratio non parva est producendi aedilicii edicti ad locationes et conductiones: 
nam si forte aedes in quinquennium conduxero, ac primo anno deprehendero ese pestilentes, 
insalubres, male sanas, cur mihi non licebit agere redhibitoria ut locator aedes suas recipiat et 
recedamus a locatione conductione? Et sane haec videtur esse mens Constitutionis Zenonis in 
l. pen., C. de loc.et cond. ex qua locatori et conductori impune licet ubique intra annum a 
contractu discedere, nisi aliud nominatim convenerit. (...). Graeca est constitutio, cuius haec 
verba restant in Basilicis. Ἡκατέρῳ διάταξις ἐπιτρέπει καὶ τῷ μισθώσαωτι καὶ τῷ 
μισθωσαμένῳ ἐξεῖναι ἐντός ἐνιαυτοῦ λύειν τὴν μίσθωσιν καὶ ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς 
ἐπαρχίαις καὶ μὴ διδόναι πρόστιμον ὡς ἐκ παραβασίας, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ 
συναλλάγματος ἀπετάξαντο ἰδικῶς τῷ τοιούτῳ συμφώνῳ ἢ ἀγράφως ἀπεῖπον'50.     
Cujas cannot see how Ulpian's deliberation in D. 21.1.63 provides any proof for the exclusion 
of the aedilitian remedies from lease. He draws this conclusion, first, by giving a new twist to 
D. 21.1.63, using linguistic arguments. The [90] humanist interpretes the Latin as indicating 
no more than that Ulpian is simply wondering to himself about the matter. The Roman jurist 
proposes anything but a definite argument to the question put forward as to whether the 
aedilitian remedies could be applied to lease. Secondly, Cujas scoured an extended version of 
the CIC for texts that could present decisive answers. Notably, Byzantine law texts, which 
originally were part of the CIC but had fallen out of the Vulgate-version, regained their full 
force in Cujas' methodological approach51. Cujas' contemporary humanist colleagues had 
                                                          
49 '(...) The argument is twofold and consists of a reply and a rejoinder. Since neither is sufficiently clear – what 
is the case most of the time when something appears remarkable to authorities who write on the law – no reason 
is firmly established, D. 11.7.9. Ulpian only judiciously notes that these are the arguments given, of which he 
himself gives no sign of approving', in: Jacobus Cuiacius, Opera omnia, vol. 3, Napels, 1758, p. 359, ch. 38. 
50 'On the contrary, on various grounds there is a strong case for extending the aedilitian edict to lease. For 
instance, if I lease a house for five years and I find out in the first year the house is rotten, unwholesome, bad for 
your health, why will I then not be allowed to sue for returning the thing, so that the landlord takes back the 
house and we rescind the contract for lease? Surely, this appears to be the drift of Zeno's constitution C. 4.65.34, 
on the grounds of which landlord and tenant are at liberty to rescind the contract with impunity at any time 
within a year, unless something else has been agreed on. (...). The constitution is in Greek and its wordings are 
still in the basilica: 'The decree provides that both lessor and lessee be allowed to rescind the lease as well in 
Italy as in all provinces and that a fine for breach of contract need not to be paid, unless at the time of the 
contract's conclusion they have - specified or unwritten - agreed to exclude that condition', Cuiacius (supra, n. 
49), p. 359. 
51 E.J.H. Schrage, Utrumque ius. Een inleiding tot de studie van de bronnen van het middeleeuwse geleerde 
recht, Amsterdam, 1987, p. 19-20; C.M. Radding & A. Ciarialli, The Corpus Iuris Civilis in the Middle Ages, 
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once again wrested these long-neglected texts from oblivion52. A key-role in this respect was 
played by Pierre Pithou, who also furnished Cujas with Byzantine texts, for which, according 
to the latter, 'the man could never be praised enough' 53 . In the present case, it was a 
constitution by Zeno which provided Cujas' with what he was looking for. It had been part of 
the Basilica,54 a ninth-century reordering of the CIC and later Byzantine scholia, which since 
Justinian's age had been accrued to the law text as a sort of second layer, offering legal 
humanists a rich source of interpretative wisdom to draw from.     
 Seen from a different angle, however, Cujas' approach did not differ much from that 
of his predecessors. Just as Irnerius and his followers had done, Cujas likewise endeavoured 
to explain the CIC' texts by referring to other texts which formed part of the same corpus, 
taking a similarly closed body of texts as his [91] point of departure 55. True, the more 
abundant supply of sources and Cujas' more profound knowledge of grammar, rhetorics, 
history and Greek enabled the humanist to achieve a more complete and critical reading of 
the texts in the CIC than the glossators had ever been capable of. Consequently, age-old 
interpretations could be altered within their Justinianic context, as our example illustrates. 
Yet, this does not change the fact that Cujas' basic assumptions of how to approach the law 
were medieval in outlook56.         
 A last point requiring attention before turning to Doneau is Cujas' disregard for the 
Accursian Gloss, which attitude seems at odds with his earlier expressed sympathy. One 
explanation in the present case might be that here the words of the Gloss expanded 'to such an 
extent that they no longer endured the name 'gloss''57. After all, the Gloss accepts implicit 
premises which are not justified by any text in the CIC58. Cujas adhered to a stricter reading 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Leiden, 2007, p. 133ff. See e.g. a 1475 Codex available online in which C. 4.65.35 (Krüger) directly follows 
upon C. 4.65.33. <http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/0008/bsb00083115/image_286>, fo 141; the Codex 
editions by Haloander (1541) and La Porta (1558) similarly do not contain Zeno's constitution which was used 
by Cuiacius. Denis Godefroy's edition has a Latin translation of it with the addition that 'this Constitution has 
been restored from the Basilica by Cuiacius. See Jacobus Cuiacius, Observationes et emendationes libri xviii, 
Cologne 1574, nr. 38: (hanc constitutionem ex Basilicis restituit Cuiacius' ); Gregorius Haloander, Codex dn. 
Iustiniani sacratissimi principis ex repetita praelectione libri xii, Basel, 1541, p. 221; Dennis Godefroy, Codicis 
dn. Iustiniani sacratissmi pp. aug. repetitae praelectionis libri xii, dl. 2, Lyon, 1583, p. 352.    
52 Cuiacius himself observes that the books from number twenty to number thirty of the Basilica have never 
been consulted by anyone as of yet: 'J'ay apporté de Venize les 15 premiers libres des basiliques, et du 20 
jusques au 30 que nul n'avoit encore veus', letter to one of the Pithou brothers, published in E. Spangenberg, 
Cujas und seine Zeitgenossen, Leipzig 1822, VI; see also H.E. Troje, Graeca leguntur, Keulen, 1971, p. 260-
263. 
53 '(...) quam mihi communicavit Petrus Pithoeus homo nunquam laudatus satis ((...) which Pierre Pithou 
communicated to me, a man who can never be praised enough)' , Cujas, op. cit. (supra, n. 51), p. 359. 
54 B. 20.1.95 = C. 4.65.34. 
55 '(...) medieval juristst had to work with a closed corpus of texts (...)', Gordley, op. cit. (supra, n. 49), p. 89; 
Flach, op. cit. (supra, n. 6), p. 222. 
56 Van den Bergh, op. cit. (supra, n. 32), p. 37. 
57 Cf. Cuiacius' Observatio II.5 and the glosse to D. 19.1.21(22). There it is questioned whether the law text 
should have a negation (non) ? Cuiacius accepts the vulgate-version with negation and dismisses the reading of 
the Codex Florentinus. He also accepts Accursius' references and comments. The only things added are further 
explanations of the Accursian Gloss ('in gloss. 'diximus' ad finem adde et l. quid tamen [D. 19.1.13.3]', Jacobus. 
Cuiacius, Notae solemnes, Frankfurt, 1598, p. 125) and classical sources corroborating Accursius' interpretation. 
op. cit. (supra, n. 53), p. 43. See also Cuiacius' glosse nulla subest causa to D. 2.14.7.4: 'Acc.[ursius] recte 
causam accipit pro datione, vel facto, (...)', Cuiacius, 'Commentarius ad titulum de pactis', in: Opera omnia, vol. 
1,  Napels, 1722, p. 926 B. 
58 Conversely, where the Gloss is content with short explanatory notes, Cuiacius does pay attention to its 
content. E.g. in Observatio II.4 Cuiacius discusses possible solutions propounded by Acccursius to solve the 
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and interpretation of [92] the text of the restored CIC. Surprisingly, doing precisely just that 
resulted in Cujas' rather innovatively defending an extension of the aedilitian remedies to 
lease, something deemed impossible from the twelfth century up until Cujas' time59.        
 
4.1.2. Doneau on the Extension of the Aedilitian Remedies to Lease. 
To Doneau the Gloss' reasoning was of more importance. According to Cujas' rival the 
different features of sales and lease were indeed decisive in determining whether the 
aedilitian edict could be applied to lease. In his commentary on the Titulus de aedilitio edicto, 
Doneau devotes the following phrases to the issue: 
'Apparet enim hoc edictum ad venditiones rerum pertinere. Unde tractatum est, an etiam ad 
alias res producendum esset, donatas puta, itemque locatas, ut si hae in eadem causa essent, 
resoluto contractu redhiberi possent. Et placet neque ad donationes pertinere, quia nullum sit 
pretium, quod donatarius recipiat: Neque ad locationes, quia non similiter locatio, ut emptio 
fiat. Locatio enim dominium mutare non solet'60.  
Virtually following the reasoning of the Gloss, Doneau too departs from a strict interpretation 
of the Justinianic law text. Just as his medieval predecessors had done, Doneau takes the 
implicit step that the difference between sales and lease, i.e. that the latter does not convey 
ownership, is sufficient reason enough for not applying the aedilitian remedies to lease. 
However, this is not mentioned in so many words in the CIC, as we just saw in the discussion 
of Cujas' treatment of the matter.        
 Yet, Doneau's attitude is not unexpected. Admittedly, he strove for putting things 
right in the head-spinning labyrinth of commentaries to the civil law, but that did not mean he 
aimed at the summary dismissal of all glosses and commentaries written on the CIC. Doneau 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
contradiction between D. 18.1. 14 and D. 18.1.41.1. Why is the sale of a table void, if it appears to be only a 
wooden table with a silver-plating instead of  a table entirely out of silver, as the buyer had imagined? In other 
words, when does one accept error in materia? Cuiacius pays particular attention to explanations proposed by 
the Bolognese professor which, according to Cuiacius, 'Accursius concocted in defiance of the spirit and the 
words of the law' ('praeter legis mentem et verba comminiscitur Accursius'). Accursius had held that the buyer 
must have stipulated that the table was made entirely of silver. As it was not, the sale was void. However, 
Cuiacius points out that no trace of such a condition was to be found in the pertinent Digest texts. Nonetheless, 
Cuiacius agrees with Accursius' alternative solution that one should consider whether the silver and other 
material could be separated. If not, there was no error. After all, a mixture of silver and other material is still 
silver. However, if the materials could be separated, the buyer was in error, which voided the sale, which was 
also the case if someone bought a massive gold bracelet which turned out to be only gilded (D. 18.1.14). 
Cuiacius opts for Accursius solution which most closely adheres to the text in the CIC. Cuiacius, op. cit. (supra, 
n. 53), p. 42–43.    
59 W. J. Klempt, Die Grundlagen der Sachmängelhaftung des Verkäufers im Vernunftrecht und Usus modernus, 
Stuttgart/Berlijn, 1967, p. 21. 
60 'Now it appears that this edict pertains to the sale of things. Hence, it has been discussed whether it should be 
extended to other things also, e.g. things donated or leased out, so that in those cases it would also be possible to 
have the thing back after rescission of the contract. However, it is suited not to apply the edict to donations, 
because there is no price received by the donatee, nor to apply it to lease, since lease is not carried out in the 
same manner as sales. After all, lease is not wont to change ownership', Hugo Donellus, In titulum de usuris in 
Pandectis et sequentem Commentarius, Lyon, 1558, p. 283. 
17 
 
wanted to achieve a systematic understanding of Justinian's civil law, which boiled down to 
solving [93] contradictions in the CIC, a task which more or less every glossator or 
commentator had also considered his own61. It would have been remarkable, to say the least, 
if none of the writers before him had written anything sensible at all. Unsurprisingly 
therefore, Doneau frequently draws from their writings. In this present case, the explanation 
put forward by the Gloss as to why the aedilitian remedies were not applicable to lease 
apparently met with Doneau's approval. 
 
 
4.2. Second Case: When do the Remedies for Latent Defects Expire? 
A rescript by Emperor Gordian III62 reads as follows: 
C. 4.58.2: Imp. Gordianus A. Petilio Maximo                           
Cum proponas servum, quem pridem comparasti, post anni tempus fugisse, qua ratione eo 
nomine cum venditore eiusdem congredi quaeras, non possum animadvertere: etenim 
redhibitoriam actionem sex mensum temporibus vel quanto minoris anno concludi manifesti 
iuris est.                     
PP. K. Dec. Gordiano A. et Aviola conss. [a. 239]63.   
The issue touched upon here is how long remedies for latent defects could be instituted for. 
The CIC contains the remedies spelled out in the aedilitian edict and the almost identical 
remedies which could be brought with the action on the sales contract. According to 
Justinianic law, the latter were cancelled after a 30-year period64. The aedilitian remedies 
already expired after six months (redhibitoria) or one year (quanto minoris)65.  
 [94] Nonetheless, in the rescript quoted above, Emperor Gordian seems to suggest 
that the action on the contract, when brought for rescission or reduction of price due to a 
latent defect, is similarly subject to the aedilitian periods of limitation instead of the 30-year 
period. After all, Emperor Gordian says that he is unable to conceive of a valid action after 
one year has lapsed, which words appear to rule out a civil action for latent defects lasting 
longer. Medieval literature extensively debated whether the periods of limitation in the event 
                                                          
61 'Solum de Iustiniani sententia videbimus, quid non inepti dici possit ad istas sententias, uti nobis relictae sunt, 
conciliandas, ne videantur contrariae, postquam Iustinianus vult, in Pandectis nullum videri inesse contrarium; 
et quidquid ad id efficiendum vel subtiliter excogitari potest, id esse recipiendum', (We only take  the Justinianic 
interpretation into consideration, for which reason it is not misplaced to say of these views [of the Roman 
jurists] – such as they have been transmitted to us – that they must be reconciled, so that they do not seem to 
contradict each other. After all, Justinian wanted it to appear that there was no contradiction in the Digest. 
Whatever can be delicately thought out to bring that to pass must be accepted as the right solution), Hugo 
Donellus, Commentarii de iure civili, vol. 2,  Neurenberg, 1822, p. 551.    
62 Reigned from 238 to 244 A.D. 
63 Emperor Gordian to A. Petilius Maximus: When you say that a slave which you bought a long time ago ran 
away after one year, I cannot think of a valid reason by which you would be able to sue the seller of the said 
slave on that account, seeing that it is plain law that the actio redhibitoria expires after six months and the actio 
quanto minoris after one year. 
64 I. 4.12pr. 
65 D. 21.1.38pr.; D. 21.1.19.6. 
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of latent defects mentioned in the edict were indeed the only ones to be applied66.   
 The Accursian Gloss explained the text in keeping with the CIC's two distinct periods 
of limitation and accepted a different limitation, according to whether a civil or praetorian 
remedy was brought 67 . Falling back on other texts in the CIC, the Gloss conceded to 
Gordian's claim that the aedilitian remedies indeed expired after one year. Nevertheless, so 
the Gloss contended, it then still remained possible to bring an action on the sales contract68. 
This begged the question as to whether Emperor Gordian had forgotten to mention that 
possibility.            
 He had not, so Bartolus (1313-1357) reasoned, because the plaintiff only had asked 
the Emperor about the aedilitian remedies, as clearly follows from the rescript's being 
accommodated under title C. 4.58. After all, this title discusses the aedilitian remedies and 
not the action on the contract. Consequently, texts under that heading cannot be used as a 
basis for assertions about the limitation period of the latter69. Besides, another commentator 
contended, if asked, Emperor Gordian would undoubtedly have confirmed the civil action's 
perpetual character70.          
 [95] Conversely, two jurist from the School of Orléans, Jacques de Révigny (†1296) 
and Pierre de Belleperche (†1308) held exactly the opposite view. On the basis of the same 
rescript they concluded that, with one year lapsed, all remedies to hold the seller of the 
escaped slave accountable ceased to be available, including the civil actions on the contract71. 
The only possible remedies for latent defects were those set out in the edict which, on the 
pain of forfeiting them, had to be brought within one year.  
                                                          
66 J. Hallebeek, ‘C. 4.58.2 and the Civil Remedy for Price Reduction. Two Ways of Reading the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis’, Revue internationale des droits de l’antiquité, 2008, p. 267–281. 
67 Gloss quanto minoris D. 19.1.13pr.: 'Item quid differt quanto minoris civilis a praetoria? Respondeo haec 
civilis, illa praetoria. Item haec perpetua, illa annalis (...)'.   
68 '(...) ex empto vero civili cum sit perpetua agere potes', Accursius in: Corpus iuris civilis, Lyon: Hugues de la 
Porte, 1558-1560, p. 752, Gloss congredia to C. 4.58.2. 
69 '(...) non obstat l. ii C. de edil. edic. [C. 4.58.2], quia ut apparet in materia in qua posita est illa lex, ibi 
querebatur utrum possent agi quanto minoris pretoria et imperator respondet non animaduerto etc. et non fuit 
quesitum in genere utrum agere posset', Bartolus, Commentaria super primam partem Digestum veterum , vol. 
2, Venice, 1526 (reprint Rome 1996), fo. 118, to D. 19.1.13pr,  n. 1. Cited in Hallebeek, op. cit. (supra, n. 66), p. 
280. 
70 'Ad dictam legem ii. C. de edil. act. [C. 4.58.2] respondetur quod imperator ibi non fuit interrogatus nisi 
utrum competeret aliqua actio pretoria et si interrogatus fuisset de ciuili respondisset imperator eam perpetuo 
competere. Et ego hoc probo ratione illius rub. C. de edil. act. que loquitur de edilitiis actionibus tantum et sic 
de propriis. Vnde et lex illa de qua in dicta lege ii. eodem titulo debet intelligi, quod loquatur de pretoria tantum 
et quod nihil dicat uel tractet de ciuili redhibitoria arg. l. Imperatores ff. de in diem adiect. [D. 18.2.16] et quod 
notat glossa in c. Bone de confirma. uti. uel inutil. [X 2.30.3],  que dicit in dubio tenendum est quod nigrum 
disponat, id quod rubrum', Baptista a Sancto Blasio (ca. 1425-1492), Tractatus utilissimus solemnissimusque de 
actione et eius natura, in: Volumen V Tractatuum ex variis iuris interpretibus collectorum, Lyon, 1549, actio 
XXI, n. 45,  fo 62, Cited in Hallebeek, op. cit. (supra, n. 66), p. 280. 
71 'Et dicit iurisconsultus [De Révigny means Gordianus, NdB] quod non animaduerto quod possit, ut C. de 
edilic e. l. ii [C. 4.58.2], set non diceret sic aliqua competeret. Et si dicas quod ciuiles actiones sunt perpetue, 
uerum est regulariter, sed non hic. Et est ratio, quia ista actio ex empto cum adiectione quanti minoris est 
redibitoria ad solucionem contractus et eius iura', Jacques de Révigny, Lectura Digesti Veteris ad D. 19.1.13, 
Leiden, d’Ablaing 2, fº 249; 'Dicit glossa, scire debetis, est quanto minoris, ut ff. de edic. e. l. Quod si nolit § Si 
plures [D. 21.1.31.5] et est effectus, quod pretoria est annalis. Est alia quanto minoris ciuilis et est perpetua, ut 
Inst. de perpe.act. in prin. [Inst. 4.12.1]. Credo quod non sit nisi una actio quanto minoris que usque ad annum 
competit tantum, ut infra de edil. act. l. ii in prin. [C. 4.58.2], cum idem sit quanto minoris et quanto minoris, ut 
ff. ad l. Fal. precia [D. 35.2.63]', Pierre de Belleperche, Lectura Codicis ad C. 4.49.9, Firenze BML Plut 6 Sin 6, 
fo 208 and Cambridge, Peterhouse 34. Cited in Hallebeek, op. cit. (supra, n. 67), p. 279. 
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4.2.1. Cujas on the Expiration of the Remedies for Latent Defects 
This time, in keeping with the Accursian Gloss, Bartolus and De Sanbiagio and contrary to 
Doneau, Cujas thought the aedilitian and civil remedies each had their own expiration period. 
In his Paratitla in libros quinquaginta Digestorum seu Pandectarum (Explanatory Notes to 
the 50 Books of the Digest) Cujas states: 
'(...) aedilitiae temporariae sunt, veluti redhibitoria semestris, aestimatoria annalis, exceptis 
casibus certis (...) Civiles perpetua sunt (...)'72.   
[96] Cujas explains these differences as follows: 
'Praecipua differentia inter eas actiones est, quod aedilitiae videntur esse poenales, d.l. 23. §. 
[D. 21.1.23.4] si servus, hoc tit. Quia nisi pareatur arbitrio iudicis (sunt enim arbitrariae) 
crescunt in duplum, l. 45. eodem tit. [D. 21.1.45] et ita poenam continent, et ob id sunt 
temporales actiones: empti vero actiones sunt perpetuae, id est, 30. annor. l. empti, inf[ra]. de 
evict'73.    
The CIC is crystal clear when it comes to the distinction it makes between the limitation 
periods attached to the civil and praetorian actions, of which the aedilitian remedies as 
derived from the ius honorarium were considered a part. The remedy for price reduction 
based on the edict is cancelled after one year, whereas its civil counterpart expires only after 
30. Cujas took great pains to explain this striking difference between two almost identical 
remedies. Again acting in a manner resembling that of a medieval glossator, the French 
scholar and humanist searched through the CIC for texts offering a possible explanation. He 
finally arrived at texts propounding the aedilitian remedies' penal character, which he took as 
the decisive feature not shared by the action on the sales contract. With this to my knowledge 
not earlier posited find, Cujas managed to harmonize seemingly contradicting texts and to 
add some more coherence to the CIC as a closed corpus of texts. 
 
4.2.2. Doneau on the Expiration of the Remedies for Latent Defects 
Contrariwise, Doneau did not heed the Gloss but adhered to the dissenting views of the jurists 
from Orléans: 
                                                          
72 '(...) the aedilitian remedies are temporal. Accordingly, the action for rescission lasts half a year and the action 
for price reduction one, certain instances excepted (...). The civil remedies are perpetual (...)', Jacobus Cuiacius, 
Paratitla in libros quinquaginta digestorum seu pandectarum imperatoris Iustiniani, in: Opera omnia, vol. 1, 
Napels, 1722, p. 778-779, to D. 21.1. 
73 'The major difference between these actions is that the aedilitian appear to be penal, D. 21.1.23.4, since they 
amount to the double, if the defendant does not heed the judgement's interlocutary order (after all, they are 
actiones arbitrariae), D. 21.1.45. Thus they contain a penalty and for that reason they are temporary actions. 
Contrariwise, the actions on the sales contract are perpetual, i.e. actions lasting for 30 years, C. 8.44.21pr.', 
Jacobus Cuiacius, Commentarii ad Libros IV codicis, in: Opera Omnia, vol. 9, Napels, 1758, p. 396 C, to  
C. 4.58. 
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'Non enim hoc agebatur, an aedilitia aliqua actio competeret, sed an aliquo modo posset agi 
iure. Ridiculum est enim, quod Bartolus ait, cum illud Gordiani rescriptum situm sit sub titulo 
de aedilitiis actionibus, accipiendum quoque esse de aedilitia quanto minoris actione. Quasi 
vero quia sub titulum de aedilitiis actionibus a Triboniano postea relatum est, efficere possit 
ut sententia Gordiani mutetur et cum appareat [97] illum de omni actione, quae eo nomine 
competere posset, respondisse, de eo non responderit [my emphasis]'74. 
  
Bartolus was wrong in thinking that the theory of the Gloss would be saved by a strict 
reading of Gordian's edict. Doneau, at least, is of the opinion that his argumentation is 
flawed: 
'Recte igitur sic dicetur: cum de omni actione consuleretur Gordianus vitii nomine, nulla 
autem alia actio quanto minoris competeret, quam ex edicto aedilium, eaque intra annum 
duntaxat, unde et generaliter de eo rescripsisset: rescriptum eius in titulum de aedilitiis 
actionibus bene relatum est [my emphasis]'75. 
 
It is not the rubric which determines the rescript's meaning. It is exactly the other way round; 
the rescript's content determines its proper place under title C. 4.58, according to Doneau. 
The content in this instance being that there is only one type of remedy for a latent defect: the 
aedilitian.            
 In speaking about content, the humanist does not pose anything new with this 
interpretation. Long before he lived, Pierre de Belleperche had already attempted to bring the 
two separate remedies for price reduction back to one: 'I believe there is only one action for 
price reduction which is only available up until one year, as stated in C. 4.58.2, because 
quanto minoris is identical to quanto minoris'76. On the other hand, Doneau makes use of a 
humanist tool, i.e. history. Relying on a reconstruction of the rescript's historical context, he 
[98] contends that Gordian was consulted about all available remedies, despite the fact that 
Tribonian had classed the rescript under title C. 4.58 'On the Aedilitian Actions'. Arguing in a 
humanist vein, Doneau reaches the solution most favourable to his better structured and 
simplified order of Justinianic law.         
 Yet, Doneau's argumentation is difficult to square with the rescript, even when seen in 
its original, pre-Justinianic context. Gordian, for example, might have been responding to a 
plaintiff who had brought the aedilitian action too late and, upon bringing the civil action 
afterwards, had seen his claim evaporating into thin air with the objection that one cannot 
start proceedings for the same issue twice77. It is feasible to assume that Gordian meant just 
                                                          
74 'After all, the rescript was not about whether the aedilitian remedy applied, but about whether it was possible 
at all to start legal proceedings. In any case, what is said by Bartolus is ridiculous, namely that, since this 
rescript of Gordian is put under the title about the aedilitian actions, it likewise must be accepted that it is about 
the aedilitian action for price reduction. As if, because Tribonian placed it under the title about the aedilitian 
actions, it could be brought about that Gordian's sentence changed and that he, though he appears to have given 
an answer for every action possibly available under the given circumstances, he in fact did not respond in 
accordance with the situation!' [my emphasis]',Donellus, op. cit. (supra, n. 61), p. 306. 
75 'One shall say it correctly in the following manner: since Gordian was consulted about every action available 
because of a defect, no other action for price reduction than that based on the edict applied and then only for one 
year. Because he responded in a general sense about the matter, his rescript is rightly placed under the title on 
the aedilitian actions' [my emphasis] ', op. cit. (supra, n. 61), p. 307. 
76 'Credo quod non sit nisi una actio quanto minoris que usque ad annum competit tantum, ut infra de edil. act. l. 
ii in prin. [C. 4.58.2], cum idem sit quanto minoris et quanto minoris, ut ff. ad l. fal. Precia [D. 35.2.63]', Pierre 
de Belleperche, Lectura Codicis ad C. 4.49.9, Firenze BML Plut 6 Sin 6, fo. 208 and Cambridge, Peterhouse 34. 
Cited in Hallebeek, op. cit. (supra, n. 67), p. 279. 
77 D. 44.2.7.1: Ulpianus libro septuagensimo quinto ad edictum: (...) et quidem ita definiri potest totiens eandem 
rem agi, quotiens apud iudicem posteriorem id quaeritur, quod apud priorem quaesitum est'; W.W. Buckland, A 
Text-book of Roman Law, Cambridge University Press 1921 , p. 689.  
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that when he said he could not think of any valid reason that the plaintiff could have for suing 
the seller of the runaway slave. Finally, Doneau conveniently disregarded the texts in the CIC 
which plainly state that civil actions hold for thirty years. The urge to ingeniously solve texts 
which do not fit together easily, seems less present in Doneau than it is in Cujas. Doneau did 
not hesitate to throw nonconforming texts to the wolves, if this served his aim to achieving a 
better systematised version of the civil law. However, both scholars were equally pragmatic 
in using humanist arguments, if these only served their aims.   
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
Legal humanism is rooted in the more general abhorrence of pre-renaissance society that 
humanist scholars felt. At first glance, Cujas and Doneau, reputed to be the standard-bearers 
of legal humanism in a lot of secundary literature, no less kept their ends up. Yet, 
contemporary secondary literature agrees that things were not as black as they seemed. The 
attitude of both humanistically inspired scholars towards their predecessors actually appears 
to have been a balanced one. However, it has seldomly been discussed which considerations 
led Cujas and Doneau to adopting their specific attitude toward medieval legal heritage. The 
same holds true for their substantive treatment of points of law in which their methodologies 
took shape. In this paper I have examined both Cujas' and Doneau's correspondence and their 
preambles to [99] authoritative works to ascertain the foundations of their methodological 
views and to discover how they put these methodologies to use. I have attempted to illustrate 
the latter by discussing two cases in which both jurists deal with substantial points of law.  
 From Cujas' correspondence it appeared that he was not inclined to steer a radically 
different course from that followed by the jurists who anteceded him. Just like his 
predecessors, Cujas strove for a consistent reading of the texts in the CIC within a Justinianic 
context. The main humanistic tool he applied to that effect was his knowledge of Greek. 
Steeped in the language of the ancients, Cujas accepted Byzantine sources as a part of the 
CIC and took Greek glosses, or scholia, into consideration, when interpreting difficult points 
of law, as I hope to have illustrated in the two cases discussed in this paper. By the same 
token – and in this he differed significantly from his medieval forebears – Cujas regarded 
Roman jurists as individuals propounding meanings which tenability could be judged. Hence, 
he notably extended the tools used for interpreting the CIC. Yet, Cujas kept working within a 
closed body of texts, be it an expanded version of that used by his medieval predecessors. 
 In the preamble to his Commentarius Doneau also expressed his appreciation of the 
effors made by his medieval colleagues. Unlike Cujas, he mirrored his task not so much to 
the one the glossators had set themselves, as to the enterprise undertaken by the 
commentators. Doneau also considered commentaries as useful tools opening paths to insight 
into the CIC. However, by choosing a systematic approach which was no longer tied to the 
CIC's order of texts, Doneau thought he was able to do better than his predecessors. Yet, he 
was not bent on discarding all the fruits of medieval learning. Despite his criticism, Doneau 
did not shrink from accepting interpretations thought out by medieval commentators, even if 
the CIC's provisions hardly allowed for such.       
 Doneau's humanist inclinations surfaced where this contributed favourably to the 
systematisation of the law he so fervently propagated as a cure for the debilitated state into 
which medieval jurisprudence had slipped. Arguing from what he thought to be the 
historically authentic purport of an imperial rescript, Doneau, other than his predecessors, 
refrained from putting any value on the place a text occupied in the CIC. In the case 
discussed this boiled down to an interpretation the content of which was difficult to chime 
with that of other texts in the CIC dealing with the same matter, which the learned jurist 
conveniently left out of consideration. Doneau's exertions to cut a way through the dense 
copice of commentaries and learned treatises that had been rampantly growing since the High 
Middle Ages not only resulted in a well manicured landscape, but also in a dismissal of any 
unruly law texts that posed a hindrance to his own systematic ordering of the law.   
